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PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER THE HOUSING 
ACT: PRESERVING RENTAL ASSISTANCE 
FOR SECTION 8 TENANTS 
John M. Lerner* 
Abstract: The Housing Choice Voucher Program provides low-income 
families with federally funded rental assistance. In order to receive rental 
assistance, tenants and landlords must maintain units in compliance with 
the Housing Quality Standards promulgated by the United States Hous-
ing Act. A failure by either party to comply with the Housing Quality 
Standards results in a termination of the federal funding. Unfortunately 
for voucher recipients, this means that they can be stripped of their rental 
assistance through no fault of their own. To remedy this situation, many 
tenants have tried to bring an action against their landlord, alleging a vio-
lation of the Housing Quality Standards under the United States Housing 
Act. Courts have routinely dismissed such claims, however, ruling that 
there is no private right of action under the Housing Act to enforce the 
Housing Quality Standards. This Note focuses on the factors that support 
a private right of action for voucher participants under the Housing Act, 
and suggests that the statutory language should be amended to expressly 
provide for such a right. 
Introduction 
 On April 2, 2010, a portion of the concrete ceiling of Ana Reyes-
Garay’s rented apartment detached and fell on top of her.1 Reyes-Garay, 
then 71 years old, suffered severe injuries to her right leg, which re-
quired several surgeries and a lengthy stay in the hospital.2 At the time 
of her injury, Reyes-Garay and her husband, José Rosa-Rivera, had lived 
at 207 Luna Street, Apartment 1-E in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico for 
more than twenty years.3 Reyes-Garay and Rosa-Rivera received rental 
assistance from the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s (“HUD”) Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program 
(“HCVP”).4 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2013–2014). 
1 Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co., 818 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417 (D.P.R. 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. Commonly known as Section 8 vouchers, the HCVP is part of the United States 
Housing Act’s comprehensive low-income assistance plan. United States Housing Act, 42 
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 Section 8 vouchers provide low-income families with rent subsidies 
to help them obtain decent, safe, and sanitary housing.5 Under this 
program, tenants awarded Section 8 vouchers select a housing unit that 
must be approved by the local public housing authority.6 The tenant 
and the landlord then execute a lease agreement, while the housing 
authority and the landlord complete a HUD-mandated Housing Assis-
tance Payment (“HAP”) contract.7 
 Two days after Reyes-Garay’s accident, the Puerto Rico Housing 
Finance Authority (“the housing authority”) inspected the apartment.8 
The housing authority discovered several issues that the landlord 
needed to address before Reyes-Garay and Rosa-Rivera could return to 
the unit.9 The landlord subsequently informed the couple that the 
housing authority had suspended their rental assistance for the unit 
until he completed the repairs.10 
 Despite several attempts to coordinate with the landlord to make 
the necessary repairs, the housing authority terminated Reyes-Garay 
and Rosa-Rivera’s rental assistance for Apartment 1-E on July 6, 2010.11 
The landlord gave them until August 25, 2010 to remove their belong-
ings.12 
 In response, Reyes-Garay and Rosa-Rivera brought an action against 
the landlord and the housing authority in the United States District 
                                                                                                                      
U.S.C. § 1437f(a), (o) (2006); see Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 417. The purpose of Sec-
tion 8 is to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and [to] pro-
mote[] economically mixed housing . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a), (o). 
6 Id. § 1437f(o)(8); Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 417 n.1. Prior to approval, the hous-
ing authority will inspect a unit to determine whether it complies with the Housing Quality 
Standards and the landlord has been approved to participate in the program. 24 C.F.R. 
§§ 982.305–.306 (2012). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7); Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 417 n.2. A Housing Assistance 
Payment contract is a written agreement between a housing authority and the landlord of a 
unit participating in the voucher program. Housing Choice Voucher Guidebook, U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. and Urban Dev. 1-1, 11-1 (2001), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/  
HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/forms/guidebook 
[hereinafter Voucher Guidebook]. Under the contract, the housing authority agrees to make 
payments directly to the landlord on behalf on the voucher recipients. Id. 
8 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 417. 
9 Id. The landlord offered Reyes-Garay and Rosa-Rivera a unit on the third floor of the 
apartment building while the repairs to their first floor apartment were tended to. Id. Un-
fortunately, Reyes-Garay was unable to stay in the new unit because her various ailments 
prevented her from climbing the stairs to the third floor. Id. at 417–18. 
10 Id. at 418. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 419. Without rental assistance, the couple could not afford to pay the entire 
rent amount. See id. 
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Court, District of Puerto Rico.13 They alleged that the defendants vio-
lated their rights as Section 8 tenants under the United States Housing 
Act of 1937 (“Housing Act”) for failure to comply with HUD’s Housing 
Quality Standards.14 Reyes-Garay and Rosa-Rivera argued that the land-
lord, as a Section 8 program participant, was obligated to maintain their 
apartment in compliance with the Housing Quality Standards and failed 
to do so.15 They also argued that the housing authority is required to 
“‘take prompt and vigorous action to enforce the owner obligations.’”16 
The landlord and the housing authority filed motions to dismiss on all 
counts, which Judge Daniel R. Dominguez granted to each defendant.17 
 In granting the motions to dismiss, the court held that Reyes-Garay 
and Rosa-Rivera did not have a private right of action to enforce the 
Housing Quality Standards under the Housing Act.18 Relying on “a 
long line of courts,” the court reasoned that there is neither an express 
nor implied right of action available to participants of the Housing 
Act’s subsidy programs to enforce the Housing Quality Standards.19 
Judge Dominguez further stated that, while low-income families are the 
intended beneficiaries of the Housing Act, the Act’s provisions only 
provide broad housing policy that is not intended to give individuals a 
right of action.20 
 The court’s decision to deny a private right of action reflects Su-
preme Court precedent that limits the circumstances in which courts 
should imply private remedies in regulatory statutes.21 Following the 
Court’s test articulated in Cort v. Ash, plaintiffs must overcome a pre-
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at 414, 417. 
14 Id. at 429; see United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(8) (2006); 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.401 (2012). Reyes-Garay and Rosa-Rivera also alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the Fair Housing Act. Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 417; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2006); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
15 Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.404(a)(2)); see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(o)(8). 
16 Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 982.404(a)(2)). 
17 Id. at 414, 439. 
18 Id. at 429, 431. 
19 Id. at 429–30. 
20 Id. at 430. 
21 Id. (“‘[T]he Supreme Court has come to view the implication of private remedies in 
regulatory statutes with increasing disfavor.’” (quoting Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham 
Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002))); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
291 (2001) (ruling that language in a regulation cannot create a private right of action 
that has not been authorized by Congress and that “[a]gencies may play the sorcerer’s 
apprentice but not the sorcerer himself”). 
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sumption against the implication of a private right.22 Although it is not 
dispositive, most courts focus mainly on the legislative intent to deter-
mine if there is an implied right of action in a statute.23 
 Courts have, however, found a private right of action for other 
provisions of the Housing Act.24 The Supreme Court first found an im-
plied private right of action for rent and utility control violations in 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority.25 The Court 
reasoned that the Housing Act provisions regarding rent and utility 
control directly benefit low-income tenants.26 Consequently, courts 
have allowed Section 8 tenants to bring private claims alleging over-
                                                                                                                      
22 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 521–
22 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff asserting an implied right of action under a federal statute 
bears the relatively heavy burden of demonstrating that Congress affirmatively contem-
plated private enforcement when it passed the statute.”); see also Paul E. Harner, Note, 
Implied Private Rights of Action Under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 1987 Duke L.J. 915, 
917 (discussing the four-part test articulated in Cort). 
23 See Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2001); Perry v. Hous. 
Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th Cir. 1981); Gilchrist v. Bakshi, 2009 WL 
4909439, at *3 (D. Md. 2009). For § 1983 claims, courts apply the test articulated in Bless-
ing v. Freestone: 
(1) Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the 
private plaintiff; (2) the right assertedly protected by the statute must not be 
so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial compe-
tence; and (3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation 
on the states, with the asserted right couched in mandatory rather than pre-
catory terms. 
Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Bless-
ing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997)). Private individuals can bring § 1983 claims 
against state actors to enforce rights created by federal statutes. Id. at 359 (noting that the 
analysis is essentially the same as the test for implied private rights of action). 
24 See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 
(1987); Johnson, 442 F.3d at 367; Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 725–30 (6th Cir. 1984). 
Although not all of these cases involve plaintiffs participating in the HCVP, courts have 
found the programs to be similar enough in kind that all provide an implied private right 
of action for rent and utility control. See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360–61 (explaining that de-
spite differences between the statutory provision in Wright and the one here, “in adopting 
the voucher program, Congress intended to create enforceable rights in participating ten-
ants to the same extent as it did in enacting the statute implicated in Wright”). 
25 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 425–32; United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (2006); 
Harner, supra note 22, at 932. Although the Supreme Court in Wright only ruled that there 
was an implied § 1983 cause of action, the lower courts have subsequently found that there 
is an implied private right of action in other contexts as well. See Howard, 738 F.2d at 725–
30; Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 620 F. Supp. 806, 809 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
26 Wright, 479 U.S. at 430. The court also reasoned that a lack of adequate enforce-
ment methods provided by the Housing Act supported a finding of an implied private 
right. See id. at 425, 427, 432; Howard, 738 F.2d at 729. 
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charges on rent or utilities.27 Despite the Court’s ruling in Wright, there 
is still a strong reluctance to expand a private right to other parts of the 
Housing Act.28 
 In comparison, courts have implied a private right of action under 
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).29 Not only are instances of intentional 
housing discrimination a violation of the FHA, but the circuit courts 
have extended the Supreme Court ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. to 
also find an implied private right for disparate impact claims brought 
under the FHA.30 In Griggs, the Court ruled that the language of Title 
VII, which relates to employment discrimination, implicitly applied to 
conduct that had a disparate impact.31 Finding the statutory language 
in the FHA to be comparable to the Title VII provisions, courts have 
concluded that disparate impact claims are also permissible under the 
FHA.32 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, 432; Johnson, 442 F.3d at 362, 367; Howard, 738 F.2d at 
730. 
28 See, e.g., Wright, 479 U.S. at 432; Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 357–59 (5th Cir. 
2009); Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 333, 339–40 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Courts have recently begun to allow § 1983 claims for provisions regard-
ing hearing procedures. See Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–23 (N.D. Ohio 
2008); Fields v. Omaha Hous. Auth., 2006 WL 176629, at *2, 3 (D. Neb. 2006). In McNeill v. 
New York City Housing Authority, the court did allow a housing quality claim based on the 
theory that the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the HAP contract between the 
housing authority and the landlord. 719 F. Supp. 233, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Hol-
brook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1271–73 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that Section 8 tenants are 
third-party beneficiaries because housing assistance contracts are designed to give them 
rental assistance). 
29 See, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 
381 (3d Cir. 2011); Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2008); Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005). The 
FHA explicitly permits private claims for intentional housing discrimination based on race, 
religion, sex, disability, and national origin. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3606 
(2006). 
30 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 
682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing the similarities between the FHA and Title VII 
as reason to imply a private right to bring disparate impact claims); United States v. City of 
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185, 1185 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits discriminatory employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Although 
the Supreme Court ruled on Cort after Griggs, the lower courts have continued to follow 
Griggs with regards to the FHA and discriminatory or disparate impact claims. See Cort, 422 
U.S. at 78; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428; Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st 
Cir. 2000); Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 n2. 
31 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
32 See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 1990); Smith, 682 F.2d 
at 1065; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 n.2. Both statutes prohibit action based on factors that 
included race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 3604. 
46 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:41 
 Both the Housing Act and the FHA focus on remedying concerns 
associated with access to housing in the United States.33 Despite similar 
policies, the rights afforded to tenants under each act are vastly differ-
ent.34 Under the Housing Act, the couple had no right of action to con-
test the housing authority’s decision.35 In comparison, had Ana Reyes-
Garay and José Rosa-Rivera been able to prove that the landlord’s re-
fusal to maintain their apartment had a discriminatory effect, they may 
have been able to bring a potential claim under the FHA.36 In the ab-
sence of any evidence of housing discrimination, however, the couple 
lost their funding without any opportunity to contest the termination.37 
The differences in statutory interpretation create the risk that Section 8 
participants will unilaterally lose their housing assistance due to land-
lord noncompliance.38 
 This Note focuses on how Section 8 tenants are affected by a lack 
of enforcement mechanisms.39 Parts I and II of this Note examine the 
differences between the enforcement of the Housing Act and FHA’s 
statutory requirements. Part III discusses the practical effect that the 
lack of a private right has on Section 8 participants. Part IV of this note 
argues that Congress should amend the Housing Act to permit a pri-
vate right of action that will further the purposes behind the Act. Ulti-
                                                                                                                      
33 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006) (“For the purpose of aiding 
low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically 
mixed housing, assistance payments may be made with respect to existing housing in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this section.”); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (“It is the policy of the 
United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the 
United States.”). 
34 See Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213–17 (asserting that “[t]here is 
clearly no indication in the legislation or in its history that Congress intended to create in 
public housing tenants a federal right of action against their municipal landlords.”). 
35 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 429–30. 
36 See Cmty. Servs., Inc., 421 F.3d at 176; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 429–30. 
37 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
38 See id.; 24 C.F.R. § 982.406 (2012); Stefanie DeLuca et al., Why Don’t Vouchers Do a Bet-
ter Job of Deconcentrating Poverty? Insights from Fieldwork with Poor Families, Poverty & Race 
(Poverty & Race Res. Action Council, Washington, D.C.), Sept./Oct. 2012, at 1, 1–2, 9–11, 
available at http://prrac.org/newsletters/sepoct2012.pdf (examining the issues Section 8 
tenants have with funding termination and the subsequent search for new housing); 
Kristine L. Zeabart, Note, Requiring a True Choice in Housing Choice Voucher Programs, 79 Ind. 
L.J. 767, 782–87 (2004) (discussing the difficulties low-income families face when search-
ing for housing). 
39 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2006); Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3613 (2006); Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. at 417–19, 431; Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 
923 (“Just as tenants can challenge a rent calculation, they should also be able to challenge 
procedures for termination of the subsidy altogether.”); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 1–
2, 9–11. 
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mately, this Note advocates for granting Section 8 tenants the right to 
ensure the Housing Quality Standards are upheld and a tenant’s rental 
assistance is not unilaterally terminated. 
I. Section 8 Voucher Program 
 Recognizing the hardships that many families face in obtaining 
quality housing, Congress passed the Housing Act in 1937.40 The stat-
ute empowers the Secretary of HUD to distribute federal housing funds 
to state and local public housing authorities.41 One of the Act’s subsidy 
programs is the Housing Choice Voucher Program.42 Under the HCVP, 
eligible families are provided with housing vouchers that subsidize a 
portion of their rent.43 Along with the eligibility requirements, a se-
lected residence must also meet the necessary Housing Quality Stan-
dards.44 If a landlord fails to meet the Housing Quality Standards, fund-
ing, in the form of rent to the landlord, is terminated and tenants are 
prohibited from taking any action against the landlord or the housing 
authority.45 
                                                                                                                      
40 See United States Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888, 888 (1937) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)); Powell v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 812 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. 
2002) (“Congress declared that it is this Nation’s policy to employ its funds to ‘remedy the 
unsafe housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and affordable dwellings 
for low income families . . . .’”) (quoting United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006)); Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1-1. 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (a)(1)(A)–(C). Congress formally authorized the voucher pro-
gram as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987. Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1815, 1819 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437). Congress passed further legislation in 1998 to 
merge separate assistance programs into one voucher program. Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2596 (1998) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437). HUD followed suit and merged the programs into the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program. Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance; Statutory Merger of 
Section 8 Certificate and Voucher Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,632 (May 14, 1999) (codified 
at 24 C.F.R. § 982); see also Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1-4 (providing an overview of 
the HCVP). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2012). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(8); 24 C.F.R. § 982.401. 
45 See Perry v. Hous. Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1216 (4th Cir. 1981); Reyes-Garay v. Inte-
grand Assurance Co., 818 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429–30 (D.P.R. 2011); 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.401, 
.404, .406. 
48 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:41 
A. Renting Under the Housing Choice Voucher Program 
 After legislation was passed granting HUD more authority to cre-
ate housing assistance programs, HUD established the HCVP in 1998.46 
The HCVP’s purpose is to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining a 
decent place to live and [to] promote[] economically mixed housing 
. . . .”47 Currently HUD’s largest housing program, the HCVP provides 
rental assistance to low-income families.48 A combination of federal and 
local administration, HUD allocates funding for the program to local 
public housing authorities.49 The housing authorities are responsible 
for distributing the HUD funding in the form of rent payments to land-
lords based on HUD’s regulatory guidelines.50 
 To begin the funding process, the housing authorities issue vouch-
ers to eligible families who meet a set low-income requirement.51 
Voucher recipients are responsible for finding their own suitable hous-
ing.52 The program is voluntary, meaning that a landlord must agree to 
rent to voucher holders.53 If the unit passes the housing quality inspec-
tion, the housing authority pays the landlord directly, and the family is 
responsible solely for their portion of the rent.54 While the housing au-
thority determines how much it will pay based on its own rent valua-
tions, a family is not restricted by that rent standard.55 For units that 
                                                                                                                      
46 112 Stat. at 2596; 24 C.F.R. § 982.1. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006). 
48 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2012); see DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 1. The HCVP subsidizes 
over 2.2 million households. DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 1. 
49 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). 
50 Id. §§ 982.101–.104. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4); 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(b); Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 4-
1. A family is considered low-income if its annual income does not exceed 80% of the me-
dian average in that geographic area. 24 C.F.R. § 5.603 (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4); 
24 C.F.R. §982.201(b). HUD also defines a “very low income” family as one that earns less 
than 50% of the area median income and an “extremely low income” family as one that 
earns less than 30% of the area median. 24 C.F.R. § 5.603; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4); 24 
C.F.R. § 982.201(b). Recognizing the threat of homelessness that extremely low-income 
families face, HUD designates that they must receive at least 75% of the vouchers given out 
over the course of a year. 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(b). Due to the high demand for housing 
assistance, eligible families are generally placed on a waiting list until funding becomes 
available. See Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 4-1. 
52 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2). 
53 See id.; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 8-15. 
54 See Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1-3. The housing authority must inspect the 
housing unit to ensure that it meets the minimum standards. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.401, .405 
(2012). 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(B) (2006); 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.505–.508; Voucher Guidebook, 
supra note 7, at 1-4. Housing authorities set the payment standard between 90 and 110% of 
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exceed HUD’s rent standard, the housing authority will contribute its 
portion of the rent and the family is charged with paying the excess.56 
Housing authorities will not fund a unit, however, if families have to 
devote more than forty percent of their income to their share of the 
rent.57 
 HCVP’s main advantage is that when families select their own 
homes, the amount of affordable, available housing increases.58 Fami-
lies can search for housing in areas that they would not be able to af-
ford without the rental assistance, providing them with more options 
than they normally would have.59 Furthermore, because vouchers are 
attached to families, not housing units, the program also allows families 
with changing needs to move without losing their government fund-
ing.60 Therefore, if a Section 8 tenant’s federal funding is terminated, 
the voucher is not immediately terminated along with it.61 
B. Housing Quality Standards & the Termination of Funding 
 Once a family and a landlord agree to rent under the voucher 
program, the housing authority must inspect the unit to make sure that 
it complies with the Housing Quality Standards.62 If the unit passes the 
initial inspection, the family and landlord enter into their own lease 
agreement.63 The lease must include HUD’s tenancy addendum stating 
the Housing Assistance Payment requirements.64 These provisions pre-
                                                                                                                      
the fair market rental value for that area. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 
7, at 1-6. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(B); 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.505–.508. The family’s share is the 
greater of 30% of adjusted income, 10% of gross income, the welfare rent, or the mini-
mum rent mandated by the housing authority. 24 C.F.R. § 982.505; Voucher Guidebook, supra 
note 7, at 1-6. 
57 24 C.F.R. § 982.508; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1-6. 
58 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2); Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1-3; DeLuca et al., su-
pra note 38, at 1. 
59 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2); Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1-3; DeLuca et al., su-
pra note 38, at 1. 
60 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.314 (2012). 
61 See id. §§ 982.303, .314. 
62 See id. § 982.401; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 10-1. The Housing Quality Stan-
dards include: sanitary facilities, food preparation and refuse disposal, space and security, 
thermal environment, illumination and electricity, structure and materials, interior air 
quality, water supply, lead-based paint, access, site and neighborhood, sanitary condition, 
and smoke detectors. Id. 
63 Id. § 982.308; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 8-21. 
64 24 C.F.R. § 982.308(2); Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 8-21. For example, the ad-
dendum stipulates how the rental payments are to be administered and the conduct that 
the tenants must adhere to while occupying the unit. See generally Tenancy Addendum, 
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empt any other portion of the lease that may be in conflict with the ad-
dendum.65 Finally, the landlord and the housing authority also enter 
into a HAP contract that runs for the same length as the lease.66 
 It is the responsibility of both the landlord and the family to en-
sure that the housing unit continues to meet the Housing Quality 
Standards throughout the family’s occupancy.67 If a unit fails to meet 
the standards, the landlord must correct the issue and have the repairs 
verified by the housing authority in order for assistance to continue.68 If 
the landlord does not make the corrections within the housing author-
ity’s required time period, the housing authority is required to termi-
nate, suspend, or reduce the subsidy payments and terminate the HAP 
contract with the landlord.69 The termination of a HAP contract does 
not take away a family’s voucher, but it falls on the family to find an-
other residence that meets the program’s standards.70 Families that do 
not find new housing within sixty days lose their voucher eligibility and 
must re-apply to the program.71 
 Program participants who wish to challenge housing authority de-
cisions have the opportunity to be heard at an informal hearing.72 The 
list of decisions that must be given an opportunity for a hearing, how-
ever, is quite limited.73 Absent from the list is a housing authority’s deci-
sion to terminate funding because a landlord has failed to comply with 
the Housing Quality Standards.74 For instance, this means a tenant may 
not challenge a landlord’s failure to fix a ceiling that has caved in.75 
HUD explicitly states in the HCVP regulations that housing authorities 
                                                                                                                      
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, available at http://www.hud. 
gov/offices/adm/hudclips/forms/files/52641-a.pdf. 
65 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.308; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 8-21. 
66 24 C.F.R. § 982.309 (2012). 
67 Id. § 982.404. Housing authorities conduct initial, annual, and special inspections. 
Id. § 982.405. 
68 Id. § 982.404. 
69 Id. Funding automatically terminates if the housing authority does not make a pay-
ment for 180 days. Id. § 982.455. 
70 See id. §§ 982.303, .314; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 15-3; see DeLuca et al., su-
pra note 38, at 1, 9. 
71 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2. 
72 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (2012); see Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 16-1 to -3. 
73 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 16-2. Housing authority 
determinations that require an opportunity for an informal hearing include, among other 
decisions, determinations of a family’s annual or adjusted income, calculations of tenant 
rent payment, and terminations of assistance due to tenant action or inaction. 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 16-2. 
74 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555; see Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 16-2. 
75 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 417; 24 C.F.R. § 982.555. 
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do not need to provide tenants with an opportunity to be heard with 
respect to this matter.76 Furthermore, HUD expressly states that the 
regulations do not provide tenants with a right to seek judicial review of 
a housing authority decision regarding the Housing Quality Stan-
dards.77 HUD’s denial of a private right of action within the regulatory 
scheme reflects a consensus view among the courts rejecting private 
claims seeking to enforce the Housing Quality Standards.78 
C. No Federal Right to Quality Housing 
 The Housing Act does not explicitly provide Section 8 voucher 
participants with a private right of action to contest housing standard 
violations.79 Therefore, it has fallen upon the courts to decide if there is 
an implied right of action under the Housing Act.80 Generally, there is 
a strong presumption against an implied right of action.81 In the lim-
ited circumstances where courts have recognized a private right, the 
focus has largely been on congressional intent.82 Still, when the in-
tended beneficiary is a special class, the courts have been more willing 
to ensure that the class’s rights are adequately protected.83 For exam-
                                                                                                                      
76 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(6). 
77 Id. § 982.406 (“Part 982 does not create any right of the family, or any party other 
than HUD or the [public housing authority], to require enforcement of the [housing 
quality standards] requirements by HUD or the [public housing authority], or to assert 
any claim against HUD or the [public housing authority], for damages, injunction or other 
relief, for alleged failure to enforce the [Housing Quality Standards].”). 
78 See Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2001); Perry, 664 F.2d at 
1215; Gilchrist v. Bakshi, 2009 WL 4909439, at *2 (D. Md. 2010); 24 C.F.R. § 982.406 
(2012). 
79 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 982.406. 
80 See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 
(1987); Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213–17; Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House 
Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 620 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
81 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677, 730–31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (reasoning that courts are hesitant to as-
sume a legislative role and create remedies for private citizens); see also Susan Gluck Mezey, 
Judicial Interpretation of Legislative Intent: The Role of the Supreme Court in the Implication of Pri-
vate Rights of Action, 36 Rutgers L. Rev. 53, 76 (1983) (“The history of the implication 
analysis . . . has clearly demonstrated the Court’s determination to stand fast against the 
onslaught of cases asserting a private right of action.”). 
82 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 n.9 (1986) (“‘Our 
focus, as it is in any case involving the implication of a right of action, is on the intent of 
Congress.’” (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 
(1981))); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1984) (“In evaluating such 
a claim, our focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in ques-
tion.”); Perry, 664 F.2d at 1212 (reasoning that the sole issue is Congress’s intent). 
83 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430; Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 
363 (5th Cir. 2006); Gonzalez, 620 F. Supp. at 809. 
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ple, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, the 
Supreme Court found that low-income tenants are undoubtedly the 
intended beneficiaries of the Housing Act.84 
 To determine an implied right of action, courts follow the four-
factor test first established by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.85 First, 
the plaintiff must be part of the “special” class for which the statute was 
enacted.86 When addressing the first factor, courts consider whether the 
statute confers a federal right to a special class.87 Second, legislative in-
tent, if it exists, must reflect Congress’s intention to grant such a rem-
edy.88 There are competing views over the meaning of congressional 
silence.89 Some have concluded that silence demonstrates Congress’ 
desire to prohibit a private right.90 Others have relied solely on silence 
as an indication to preclude a private right.91 Third, a private right must 
be “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme 
. . . .”92 The courts have considered whether a private remedy would 
interfere with the discretionary actions of an administrative agency, 
such as HUD, as well as whether the enforcement procedures promul-
gated by the agency are sufficient.93 Finally, the cause of action must 
not be “traditionally relegated to state law.”94 
 Employing the Cort test, the majority of courts have ruled that the 
Housing Act does not have an implied private right to action.95 This 
reflects the Supreme Court’s strong reluctance to read private rights of 
action into federal statutes.96 A narrow interpretation of the Housing 
Act, however, has led courts to generally find an implied private right of 
action for rent control violations.97 
                                                                                                                      
84 Wright, 479 U.S. at 430. 
85 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
86 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; Howard, 738 F.2d at 726. 
87 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; Howard, 738 F.2d at 726; Harner, supra note 22, at 917. 
88 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
89 See Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213, Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 333, 339–40 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (demonstrating the various interpretations of congressional silence). 
90 Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213. 
91 Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 340. 
92 Id. at 339 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78). 
93 See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 366; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 339. 
94 Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 339 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78); see Perry, 664 F.2d at 1216 
(reasoning that landlord-tenant disputes are matters of state law); Samuels v. District of 
Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 201 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
95 See, e.g., Perry, 664 F.2d at 1211–12, 1217; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 340. 
96 See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 291; Mezey, supra note 81, at 76. 
97 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 425; Johnson, 446 F.3d at 362–63; Howard, 738 F.2d at 730. 
2014] Preserving Rental Assistance for Section 8 Tenants 53 
1. No Tenant Enforcement of the Housing Quality Standards 
 In applying the Cort test to the Housing Act, most courts have 
ruled that there is no implied right of action for tenants to enforce the 
Housing Quality Standards.98 Courts note that the language of the stat-
ute directs the regulating agency to ensure quality standards and does 
not focus on protecting the class of individuals the statute is directed 
towards.99 The courts have reasoned that although a housing authority 
is required to ensure that landlords comply with the Housing Quality 
Standards, neither “[t]he statute nor the regulations nor any court has 
burdened a Section 8 tenant with this responsibility or bestowed a Sec-
tion 8 tenant with [the right to enforce the Housing Quality Stan-
dards].”100 For instance, in Edwards v. District of Columbia, the court 
ruled that the fact that low-income families are the intended beneficiar-
ies of the Housing Act is not enough to infer a private right of action.101 
Without any evidence of legislative intent, general policy statements do 
not convey a private right.102 The court also reasoned that the fact there 
is no constitutional right to low-income housing supports the denial of 
an implied private right.103 
 Along with precluding a private right, most courts have also ruled 
that Section 8 tenants cannot allege a Section 1983 violation.104 While 
the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone articulated a slightly different 
test for Section 1983 claims than the one in Cort, the analysis still fo-
cuses on congressional intent and the workability of the legislative 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Alexander, 532 U.S. 
at 289); Banks, 271 F.3d at 611 (“Congress does not intend to create a private right of ac-
tion where a statute is ‘phrased as a directive to federal agencies engaged in the distribu-
tion of federal funds.’” (quoting Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 
(1981))). 
99 See Anderson, 556 F.3d at 358; Banks, 271 F.3d at 611. 
100 Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 429; see 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.404(a)(2), .406 (2012). 
101 Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 340. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 342; see Hernandez v. Pierce, 512 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Harner, 
supra note 22, at 940–41. 
104 See, e.g., Anderson, 556 F.3d at 358 (ruling that the Housing Act provision at issue fo-
cused on the person regulated, not residents of housing developments); Edwards, 628 F. 
Supp. at 342 (“[P]laintiffs have no constitutional right to housing of a particular quality.”). 
A § 1983 claim provides relief to individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated 
by persons acting under the authority of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The test to 
find an implied right of action under § 1983 is different than the Cort analysis. Compare 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (articulating the test for a § 1983 
claim), with Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (stating the test for a private right of action). 
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scheme to imply a federal right.105 Applying Blessing, the courts have 
reasoned that there is no federal right to housing that a state entity 
could possibly violate.106 Moreover, the congressional intent behind the 
Housing Act does not imply a statutory right to housing.107 
 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Banks v. Dallas 
Housing Authority asserted that the language of the Housing Quality 
Standards provision is too “‘vague and amorphous’” to be judicially en-
forceable.108 The court also reasoned that the provision of the Housing 
Act in question does not impose a binding obligation on a state actor to 
maintain decent housing conditions.109 Instead, the court said the pro-
vision merely requires that a residency must be in proper condition or 
it will not receive Section 8 funding.110 
 Courts are reluctant to imply a private right because the statutory 
language is not directed at the program participants.111 The courts rea-
son that the “‘text must be phrased in terms of the persons benefitted’” 
to establish the congressional intent to create a private right.112 On the 
other hand, courts have interpreted the statutory language of the rent 
control provisions to be indicative of Congress’s intent to convey a pri-
vate right.113 
2. The Implied Private Right to Rent Control 
 While Housing Act claims are generally dismissed, some courts 
have narrowly interpreted the statute to permit rent and utility control 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41; Caswell v. Detroit Hous. Comm’n, 418 F.3d 615, 619 
(6th Cir. 2005) (“‘But the inquiries overlap in one meaningful respect—in either case we 
must first determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right.’” (quoting Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002))); Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 
(N.D. Ohio 2008); Harner, supra note 22, at 938. 
106 See e.g, Banks, 271 F.3d at 610–11; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1217; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 
342. 
107 See e.g, Banks, 271 F.3d at 610–11; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 
340. 
108 Banks, 271 F.3d at 609–11 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41). 
109 Id. at 610. 
110 Id. 
111 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2006); Banks, 271 F.3d at 610–
11; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1217. The courts reason that the statutory language of the Housing 
Act directs HUD to provide assistance to housing authorities. See Banks, 271 F.3d at 610–11; 
Perry, 664 F.2d at 1217. 
112 Caswell, 418 F.3d at 619 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283); see Banks, 271 F.3d at 
610; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1217; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 341. 
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a; Wright, 479 U.S. at 430; Johnson, 442 F.3d at 363; Howard, 738 
F.2d at 726; Gonzalez, 620 F. Supp. at 809. 
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claims.114 Using the Cort test, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Howard v. Pierce found that the plaintiff did have a private right to en-
force the amount of rent the defendant could charge under the Hous-
ing Act.115 In its analysis, the court reasoned that the plaintiff, a low-
income housing tenant, was clearly the intended beneficiary of the 
Housing Act and therefore satisfied the first prong of the Cort test.116 
 With regards to the second prong of the Cort test, courts have 
found little evidence indicating that Congress intended to create a pri-
vate right for rent enforcement.117 Some courts have relied heavily on 
congressional silence to reject an implied private right to action.118 
Other courts, however, such as the Howard court, have reasoned that 
the lack of legislative intent merely means that “no further conclusions” 
can be made until the other factors are considered.119 
 In assessing the third Cort factor, determining the legislative 
scheme, the court in Howard stated that a private remedy would not 
interfere with the Housing Act’s underlying purpose.120 Rather, a pri-
vate remedy would assist in providing “decent, safe, sanitary and af-
fordable housing” to low-income families.121 The court also noted that 
the lack of private enforcement mechanisms throughout the statute 
support an implied right.122 Thus, the court ruled that there was an 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 431–32; Johnson, 442 F.3d at 362–63; Howard, 738 F.2d at 730; 
Gonzalez, 620 F. Supp. at 809. Congress enacted the Brooke Amendment in 1969 to limit 
the amount of rent low-income families could be charged in public housing projects. Pub 
L. No. 91-152, 83 Stat. 379, 389 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437). Al-
though the Brooke Amendment does not apply to the HCVP, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Johnson found that Congress intended to create the same enforceable rights for 
tenants participating in all of the Housing Act’s assistance programs. See 442 F.3d at 361. 
For the HCVP, the pertinent provisions of the Housing Act still impose a rent ceiling for 
families that do not exceed the payment standard calculated by the housing authority. 42 
U.S.C. 1437f(o)(2)(A). The only difference is that families who exceed the payment stan-
dard have to pay the difference. Id. § 1437f(o)(2)(B). The court in Johnson categorized this 
as a “classic distinction without a difference.” 442 F.3d at 362. In McNeill v. New York Hous-
ing Authority, the court did allow a housing quality claim based on the theory that the 
plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the HAP contract between the housing authority 
and the landlord. 719 F. Supp. 233, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 
1261, 1271–73 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that Section 8 tenants are third-party beneficiaries 
because HAP contracts are intended to provide them with rental assistance). 
115 Howard, 738 F.2d at 725–30; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437a. 
116 Howard, 738 F.2d at 726. 
117 See Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Howard, 738 F.2d at 727–28; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 340. 
118 See Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 340. 
119 See Howard, 738 F.2d at 727–28; Harner, supra note 22, at 927. 
120 Howard, 738 F.2d at 728. 
121 Id. at 730. 
122 Id. at 729 (“We do not believe that Congress established the goal of providing de-
cent housing only to allow the goal to be frustrated by statutory violations.”). If select pro-
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implied private right of action under the rent and utility control provi-
sions of the Act.123 
 Following Supreme Court precedent, courts have also held that 
low-income housing tenants have an implied right to bring Section 
1983 claims under the Housing Act.124 For example, in Wright, the Su-
preme Court considered the lack of recourse provided by HUD for al-
leged housing authority violations to be a strong reason to infer a Sec-
tion 1983 right of action.125 
 Still, courts that identify an implied private right under the Hous-
ing Act limit the implication to the rent control provisions.126 Courts 
that have denied an implied private right with regards to the Housing 
Quality Standards reason that the lack of congressional intent pre-
cludes such a finding.127 Consequently, Section 8 tenants do not have 
any way of contesting a termination of their funding that was caused by 
a landlord’s noncompliance with the Housing Quality Standards.128 
 The lack of judicial activism to imply a private right to enforce the 
Housing Quality Standards necessitates Congress taking action and ex-
plicitly providing Section 8 tenants with a means of challenging these 
terminations.129 In comparison, the courts have taken a very expansive 
                                                                                                                      
visions had explicitly permitted a private cause of action, then the court would have con-
cluded that silence indicates a congressional intent to preclude a private right. See id. 
123 Id. at 730. Although some courts have argued that an alleged Housing Act violation 
should be left to traditional landlord-tenant law, not all violations involve lease disputes, 
and the Housing Act policy suggests that low-income housing is a federal issue. See United 
States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006). Compare Howard, 738 F.2d at 730 n.15 (ruling 
that the issue of a rent ceiling is a federal concern that goes beyond landlord-tenant law), 
with Samuels, 770 F.2d at 201 n.14 (finding that Congress did not intend to create a federal 
right to every aspect of landlord-tenant disputes), and Perry, 664 F.2d at 1216 (reasoning 
that landlord-tenant disputes are exclusively state law matters). 
124 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 432; Johnson, 442 F.3d at 367. 
125 Wright, 479 U.S. at 427. 
126 Compare id. at 430 (implying a private cause of action for a § 1983 rent control viola-
tion), and Johnson, 442 F.3d at 367 (finding that there is an implied private right for 
voucher participants with regards to rent control), with Banks, 271 F.3d at 611 (ruling that 
there is no private right to enforce the Housing Quality Standards). 
127 See Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 340. 
128 See Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 431; 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.406, 
.555 (2012); see also DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10 (chronicling the difficulties Section 
8 tenants have with the Housing Quality Standards). 
129 See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 366 (finding that “[t]here simply is no comprehensive fed-
eral remedial scheme provided for the voucher program” to demonstrate Congress’s in-
tent to preclude a private right); Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923 (“Just as tenants can 
challenge a rent calculation, they should also be able to challenge procedures for termina-
tion of the subsidy altogether.”); Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778, 787 (Mass. 
Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the high stakes that are involved when a housing authority ter-
minates funding). 
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approach to implied rights under the FHA.130 Recent federal circuit 
decisions considering a disparate impact claim under the FHA have 
found that the Act provides an implied private right for such claims.131 
II. Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act 
 Similar to the Housing Act, Congress enacted The Fair Housing 
Act of 1968 to “provide . . . for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”132 Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[to] refuse to sell or rent after 
the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or 
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any per-
son because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national ori-
gin.”133 The FHA provides for two remedies.134 Individuals may have 
their complaints heard during an administrative hearing or may bring a 
private action in either state or federal court.135 Along with the private 
causes of action explicitly permitted under the FHA, courts have also 
taken a very expansive approach to implied rights of action, including 
disparate impact claims.136 Courts’ interpretations of the FHA are so 
                                                                                                                      
130 See, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 
375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011); Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2008); Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005). 
131 See, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); Larkin v. 
State of Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1996); Keith v. Volpe, 858 
F.2d 467, 482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ann B. Lever & Todd Espinosa, A Tale of Two Fair 
Housing Disparate-Impact Cases, 15 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Law 257, 258 (2006) 
(stating that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has yet to rule definitely on the issue, every 
federal circuit that has considered the issue has agreed that a plaintiff need not prove dis-
criminatory intent on the part of a defendant” to be successful on an FHA claim). 
132 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 
Stat. 73, 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619). 
133 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). In 1988, the FHA was amended to add handicapped persons 
and families with children to the list of classes protected under the Act. Fair Housing Act 
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, 1619 (1988) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3602, 3604, 3606). 
134 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3613. 
135 Id. The Attorney General can also bring a federal suit. Id. § 3614. In order to have 
standing to bring a claim under the FHA, an individual must fall under the statute’s “ag-
grieved person” definition and reside in a “dwelling.” See id. §§ 3603(a), 3613(a)(1)(A). 
The statute defines an aggrieved person as someone who “claims to have been injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice.” Id. § 3602(i). A dwelling is defined as any building occu-
pied or intended to be occupied as a residence and any vacant land sold or leased for the 
construction of such building. Id. § 3602(b). 
136 See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A plaintiff can estab-
lish a FHA discrimination claim under a theory of disparate treatment or disparate im-
pact.”); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982). In Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, the court found that the similarities between the FHA and Title VII made it per-
missible to allow a disparate impact claim. 682 F.2d at 1065. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the 
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broad that the Sixth Circuit has recognized that Section 8 tenants also 
have a claim under the FHA.137 Even with this narrow interpretation of 
the FHA, however, the majority of Section 8 tenants are still left without 
any recourse when it comes to enforcing the Housing Quality Stan-
dards.138 This is in stark contrast to the different types of potential dis-
crimination claims that tenants can bring under the FHA.139 
A. Disparate Treatment Claims 
 Under the FHA, it is unlawful to discriminate against a person be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or na-
tional origin.140 Courts have interpreted the statutory language, espe-
cially the phrase “otherwise make unavailable or deny,” to provide for a 
large spectrum of activity that may be considered discriminatory.141 An 
individual can bring an action “whether or not [the individual is] the 
target of the discrimination.”142 Some courts have interpreted the 
FHA’s broad language to reflect Congress’s intention that the FHA cov-
ers virtually any type of activity related to housing.143 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
Supreme Court had previously ruled that proof of a disparate impact is sufficient to prove 
a Title VII violation. 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Smith, 682 
F.2d at 1065; see also Lever & Espinosa, supra note 131, at 258 (discussing disparate impact 
FHA claims). 
137 See Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations 
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Evan Forrest Anderson, Note, Vouching 
for Landlords: Withdrawing from the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program and Resulting 
Disparate Impact Claims—Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro 
Human Relations Commission, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007), 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 371, 380–83 
(2009) (analyzing disparate impact claims involving Section 8 tenants); Rebecca Tracy 
Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing Act Claims: Landlord Withdrawal 
from the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1971, 1995 (2010) (discussing Sec-
tion 8 disparate impact claims). 
138 See Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 369; Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co., 818 
F. Supp. 2d 414, 435 (D.P.R. 2011); Rotem, supra note 137, at 1995. 
139 See, e.g., Harris, 183 F.3d at 1051; Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065. 
140 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3606, 3617 (2006). 
141 See id. § 3604(a); see, e.g., United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 
716, 726 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-American Fire & Cas. Co., 472 
F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (S.D. Ohio 1979); United States v. Hughes Mem’l Home, 396 F. Supp. 
544, 549 (W.D. Va. 1975). 
142 Harris, 183 F.3d at 1050 (emphasis omitted) (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. at 726; Dunn, 472 F. 
Supp. at 1108; Hughes Mem’l Home, 396 F. Supp. at 549. The statute also mandates that it is 
illegal “[t]o discriminate . . . in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(b). 
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Court has held that this language should be interpreted “as broadly as 
is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” 144 
 FHA claims include cases of intentional housing discrimination 
known as disparate treatment claims.145 The plaintiff must provide evi-
dence demonstrating that “some discriminatory purpose was a ‘motivat-
ing factor’ behind the challenged action.”146 The motivation does not 
need to be malicious or invidious.147 Rather, the plaintiff only has to 
prove that a protected characteristic somehow affected the defendant’s 
conduct.148 In turn, if the defendant cannot prove that they would have 
acted the same way regardless of the alleged discrimination, the FHA is 
violated.149 For example, in United States v. Big D Enterprises, Inc., the 
court found a disparate treatment violation based on evidence that the 
defendant personally instructed his apartment managers not to rent to 
black applicants.150 The court there rejected the defendant’s assertion 
that minorities were rebuffed due to “application deficiencies” as a le-
gitimate nondiscriminatory motive.151 
 Disparate treatment claims also include “mixed motive” cases—
instances where the alleged discriminatory conduct was motivated by 
both legitimate and prohibited reasons.152 Although the Supreme 
Court has never ruled on a “mixed motive” FHA claim, the lower courts 
have adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning regarding employment 
discrimination in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, holding that a claimant 
need only establish that the contested housing conduct was motivated 
in part by some illegal intent.153 The burden then shifts to the defen-
                                                                                                                      
144 See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 
(3d Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145 See Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2005). 
146 Cmty. Servs., Inc., 421 F.3d at 177; see Kormoczy v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. ex. rel. Briggs, 53 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1995). For plaintiffs relying on indirect rather 
than direct evidence, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is different. Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 823–
24; see Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2007); Cmty. House, Inc. v. Boise, 
490 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). 
147 Cmty. Servs., Inc., 421 F.3d at 177 (quoting Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 
1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
148 Id. 
149 See United States v. Big D Enters., 184 F.3d 924, 932 (8th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Anchor 
Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 235–36 (8th Cir. 1976). 
150 Big D Enters., 184 F.3d at 929, 934, 936. 
151 Id. at 932. 
152 See id. at 931; Bachman v. St. Monica’s Congregation, 902 F.2d 1259, 1262 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
153 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252, 258 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 superseded the Court’s ruling regarding a plaintiff’s remedies, but not the actual test 
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dant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they would 
have taken the same action regardless of the alleged discriminatory 
motive.154 
 Despite any explicit statutory language, the circuit courts have 
generally concluded that intent is not required for an FHA violation.155 
The courts have analogized the Supreme Court’s ruling on employ-
ment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.156 Comparing the simi-
larities between the language in each statute, the courts have implied a 
private right of action for claims that lack intent, yet still have a dispa-
rate impact.157 
B. Disparate Impact Theory 
 A disparate impact violation involves instances where a policy af-
fects a class of persons protected under the FHA greater than it affects 
non-protected classes, regardless of whether there is discriminatorily 
motivated intent behind the action.158 The crucial component of a dis-
parate impact case is the statistical evidence demonstrating that the de-
fendant’s conduct has a greater impact on an FHA-protected class than 
it does on others.159 An early case to find a disparate impact claim un-
                                                                                                                      
for finding liability in a mixed motive case. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)); Price Water-
house, 490 U.S. at 258; Giles, supra note 151, at 821. 
154 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
155 See, e.g., Hallmark Developers, Inc., 466 F.3d at 1286; Edwards v. Johnston Cnty. Health 
Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223 (4th Cir. 1989); Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Huntington, 
844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Anderson, supra note 137, at 376, 378–79 (discuss-
ing disparate impact under the FHA); Rotem, supra note 137, at 1987–89 (summarizing 
FHA disparate impact cases). 
156 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Langlois v. Abington Hous. 
Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065; United States v. City of Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185, n.2 (8th Cir. 1974). 
157 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428; Langlois, 207 F.3d at 49–50; Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065; Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185, n.2. 
158 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996); Simms v. 
First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). The other type of disparate impact 
claims involve instances where a policy “perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents 
interracial association.” Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290; see Huntington Branch, 
N.A.A.C.P., 844 F.2d at 937. Defendants of such a claim have the opportunity to present a 
justification for continuing the practice. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503; Betsey v. Turtle 
Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984). 
159 See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 
382–85 (3d Cir. 2011); White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., Ohio, 606 F.3d 
842, 851 (6th Cir. 2010); Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988. 
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der the FHA was Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates.160 There, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that a landlord’s policy of evicting families 
with children disproportionally affected the building’s minority ten-
ants.161 Using statistical evidence, the court found that the landlord’s 
new policy resulted in the evictions of 74.9% of the non-white ten-
ants.162 Only 26.4% of white residents were evicted.163 Considering 
these figures, the court reasoned that the landlord’s policy disparately 
impacted an FHA-protected class.164 
 In response to the increasing number of disparate impact claims 
under the FHA, HUD recently implemented a regulation explicitly 
providing for such causes of action under the Act.165 Under the regula-
tion, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing that the chal-
lenged conduct had a disparate impact on a protected class.166 The de-
fendant would then have the opportunity to offer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason justifying the practice.167 Finally, the plaintiff 
could still succeed by proving that another, less discriminatory method 
could accomplish the same goals.168 Although courts have already ac-
knowledged disparate impact claims, there is a circuit split over 
whether Section 8 tenants can rely on the disparate impact theory.169  
                                                                                                                      
160 See Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500); HUD Proposes Rules 
Establishing Standards for Disparate Impact Claims, Nat’l Multi Hous. Council, available at 
http://www.nmhc.org/Content.cfm?ItemNumber=55671 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
166 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,460; HUD Proposes Rules Establishing Standards for Disparate Impact Claims, supra 
note 165. 
167 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,460; HUD Proposes Rules Establishing Standards for Disparate Impact Claims, supra 
note 165. 
168 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,460; HUD Proposes Rules Establishing Standards for Disparate Impact Claims, supra 
note 165. 
169 See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 382 (“Typically, ‘a disparate 
impact is shown by statistics.’” (quoting Hallmark Developers, Inc., 466 F.3d at 1286)). Com-
pare Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 369 (implying a Section 8 tenant’s right to bring a dis-
parate impact claim under the FHA), with Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 
136 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing a Section 8 tenant’s disparate impact claim), 
and Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling that 
there is no disparate impact relief for Section 8 tenants under the FHA). 
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C. The Disparate Impact on Section 8 Tenants 
 Discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders in the private 
housing market is a modern dilemma.170 Discrimination due to a fam-
ily’s Section 8 status limits the number of viable living areas for pro-
gram participants.171 For example, a study conducted in the Chicago 
area concluded that voucher holders are precluded from as much as 
seventy percent of available housing.172 In response, Section 8 program 
participants have tried to bring disparate impact claims under the 
FHA.173 While voucher holders are not a protected class, plaintiffs have 
argued that a landlord’s withdrawal from the program or refusal to rent 
has a disparate impact on one of the FHA’s protected classes.174 
 Currently, circuits split on whether the disparate impact theory 
applies to Section 8 withdrawal cases.175 In the Seventh Circuit, the 
court rejected a disparate impact claim based on the precedent that not 
“every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal.”176 
Rather, the court reasoned that it is a matter of court discretion to de-
termine whether the facts of a case merit a disparate impact analysis.177 
Moreover, the court stressed the voluntary nature of Section 8 pro-
grams as a reason why disparate impact claims should not apply to Sec-
tion 8 landlords.178 The court reasoned that allowing disparate impact 
claims would only deter landlords from participating in the program 
and further decrease the availability of housing.179 
 In comparison, the Sixth Circuit has allowed a Section 8 plaintiff 
to bring a disparate impact claim based on a landlord’s withdrawal 
                                                                                                                      
170 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2, 9; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1980–81; Zeabart, 
supra note 38, at 782–87. 
171 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 982; see Elizabeth Kneebone, et al., The Re-Emergence of 
Concentrated Poverty: Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s, Brookings 1 (2011), http://www. 
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/03%20poverty%20kneebone% 
20nadeau%20berube/1103_poverty_kneebone_nadeau_berube. 
172 Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982. 
173 See id. at 1990–91; Hallmark Developers, Inc., 466 F.3d at 1286. 
174 See Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 369; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1990–91. 
175 See Anderson, supra note 137, at 380–83 (discussing disparate impact claims involv-
ing Section 8 tenants). Compare Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 369 (allowing Section 8 ten-
ants to bring a disparate impact claim under the FHA), with Salute, 136 F.3d at 302 (dis-
missing a Section 8 disparate impact claim), and Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (ruling that 
Section 8 tenants do not have a right to bring a disparate impact claim under the FHA). 
176 Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280; see Salute, 136 F.3d at 302; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1992–
94. 
177 Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. 
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from the Section 8 program.180 In Graoch Associates #33, L.P. v. Louis-
ville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations Commission, the landlord’s 
decision to withdraw from the program affected eighteen families, sev-
enteen of which were minorities.181 The court allowed the claim, reject-
ing a “categorical” bar excluding Section 8 landlords from disparate 
impact liability.182 It held that that courts may bar all claims that could 
never succeed under the burden-shifting analysis of the test.183 
 Overall, the FHA provides individuals with several methods of pro-
tecting their right to equal housing opportunities.184 Although the 
Housing Act has slightly different policy considerations, the availability 
of decent and affordable housing is also a crucial right that should be 
protected.185 To help further this goal, individuals should be entitled to 
bring private suits enforcing the Housing Quality Standards of the 
Housing Act.186 
III. Housing Issues Resulting from the Lack of  
Enforcement Mechanisms 
 Courts generally reason that Section 8 tenants do not have an im-
plied private right of action because there is no right to quality housing 
of any kind.187 Yet protecting a right to quality housing is not the goal 
                                                                                                                      
180 Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 369. In contrast to Graoch Assocs. #33, Salute and 
Knapp involved cases in which the landlords never participated in the Section 8 program. 
Anderson, supra note 137, at 380; see Salute, 136 F.3d at 296; Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1275. 
181 Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 370. 
182 Id. at 377. The court eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because he failed to 
state a prima facie case of disparate impact. Id. at 377–78. 
183 Id. at 375. The court used NAACP v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company as an 
example of a case where a court would not apply the disparate impact test. Id.; see 978 F.2d 
287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992). There, the court ruled that an insurer’s reasons for declining 
certain areas outweighed “any possible disparate impact the policy could have.” Graoch 
Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 375 (citing NAACP, 978 F.2d at 290). 
184 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606, 3617 (2006); see, e.g., Hallmark Devel-
opers, Inc., 466 F.3d at 1286; Cmty. Servs., Inc., 421 F.3d at 177; Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 
F. Supp. at 726. 
185 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006); id. § 3601; Stevenson v. 
Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 
778, 787 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008); Harner, supra note 22, at 943. 
186 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 362 
(5th Cir. 2006); Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923; Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 787; Harner, supra 
note 22, at 943. 
187 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006); Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 
271 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2001); Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 
1102 (6th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that there is no constitutional right to quality housing); 
Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co., 818 F. Supp. 2d 414, 435 (D.P.R. 2011) (“A section 
8 tenant does not have the right to choose absolutely any housing unit . . . .”); Edwards v. 
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of a private enforcement right of the Housing Quality Standards.188 In-
stead, a private right would allow for challenges to the termination of 
program funding, which can have dire consequences for Section 8 
families.189 In a very competitive housing market, it is likely that termi-
nation of funding can lead to a loss of status as a participant in the 
HCVP.190 Moreover, when a landlord withdraws from the Section 8 pro-
gram, it is the tenants who are affected the most because they rely on 
the government funding.191 Additionally, there is the threat that land-
lords are using the voucher program status as a proxy for discrimina-
tory housing practices.192 Without a private right, Section 8 tenants are 
left with only one option—to find housing on their own without any 
federal funding.193 
A. The Realities of a Termination of Assistance 
 When a local housing authority terminates a family’s rent subsidy, 
the family is reverted back to voucher status.194 This means that the 
family is still eligible to receive the subsidy, but it falls upon them to 
find a new housing unit that meets the Housing Act’s standards.195 Un-
fortunately, the high demand for affordable housing, the low supply of 
                                                                                                                      
District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 333, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that statutory provi-
sion invoked by plaintiffs did not create a federal right and that there is no “constitutional 
right to decent, safe, and sanitary housing”). 
188 Cf. Banks, 271 F.3d at 611 (framing the issue as a right to protect quality housing); 
Jaimes, 758 F.2d at 1102; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 435; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 342. 
189 See Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“Just as tenants 
can challenge a rent calculation, they should also be able to challenge procedures for ter-
mination of the subsidy altogether.”); Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778, 787 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (discussing the high stakes that are involved when a housing author-
ity terminates funding); see also Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 
362, 367 (5th Cir. 2006) (using the entirety of the legislative enactment of the Housing Act 
to find an implied private right in different sections). 
190 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303 (2012); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2. 
191 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1995. 
192 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 1980–82; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 786–87. 
193 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9–10; Margery Austin Turner & G. Thomas 
Kingsley, Federal Programs for Addressing Low-Income Housing Needs: A Policy Primer, Urban 
Inst., at 3 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411798_low-income_ 
housing.pdf; Dan Nnamdi Mbulu, Note, Affordable Housing: How Effective Are Existing Federal 
Laws in Addressing the Housing Needs of Lower Income Families?, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. 
Pol’y & L. 387, 400–01 (2000). 
194 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.303, .314; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10. 
195 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.302–.303, .314, .401; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2, 10. 
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housing available, and poor access to housing information can make 
the housing search a daunting process.196 
 In addition, a family has a very limited time to secure new housing 
before its voucher status is permanently revoked.197 Voucher status is 
revoked after only sixty days.198 At this point, the family must then re-
apply to the program.199 A substantial amount of Section 8 participants 
are faced with this pressing issue.200 For example, a study done by HUD 
in the early 2000s concluded that only sixty-nine percent of voucher 
holders were successful in finding housing.201 The economic downturn 
and the housing market crash have likely made it even more difficult 
for a family to find a home within the sixty-day period.202 
 Low-income families who have no choice but to rent without any 
government funding face financial hardship.203 With a high portion of 
their income going towards rent, families must cut back on essential 
needs such as food and clothing.204 Furthermore, a lack of rental assis-
tance limits the locations where families can afford housing.205 These 
areas usually have high concentrations of poverty.206 A study done by 
the American Community Surveys and Census 2000 concluded that the 
number of families living in neighborhoods where at least forty percent 
of households are under the poverty line increased by almost a third in 
the past decade.207 The lack of rental assistance also means low quality 
                                                                                                                      
196 See United States v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dis-
cussing the effects of a lack of affordable housing); Turner & Kingsley, supra note 193, at 3; 
Margery Austin Turner et al., Section 8 Mobility and Neighborhood Health: Emerging Issues and 
Policy Challenges, Urban Inst., at 31, 39 (2000), available at http://urban.org/uploadedPDF/ 
sec8_mobility.pdf. 
197 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.303, .314 (2012); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2. 
198 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2. 
199 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2. 
200 See Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d at 556; Turner & Kingsley, supra note 193, at 3; 
Rotem, supra note 137, at 1979–80. 
201 Meryl Finkel & Larry Buron, Study on Section 8 Voucher Success Rates, Volume I Quantita-
tive Study of Success Rates in Metropolitan Areas, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Office of 
Policy Dev. & Research, at i (2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/ 
pdf/sec8success.pdf. 
202 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2; Kneebone, et al., supra 
note 171, at 1. 
203 Douglas Rice & Barbara Sard, Decade of Neglect Has Weakened Federal Low-Income Hous-
ing Programs: New Resources Required to Meet Growing Needs, Ctr. on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, at 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-24-09hous.pdf; Turner 
& Kingsley, supra note 193, at 1. 
204 Rice & Sard, supra note 203, at 1–2. 
205 See Kneebone, et al., supra note 171, at 5–6; Rice & Sard, supra note 203, at 6–7. 
206 See Kneebone, et al., supra note 171, at 5–6; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 782–83. 
207 Kneebone, et al., supra note 171, at 5. The Study was done from 2005–2009. Id. 
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housing conditions.208 Many families live in overcrowded, unhealthy 
units where there are high crime rates and low-quality public educa-
tion.209 
 Additionally, low-income families without rent assistance struggle 
to maintain a stable home environment.210 A family may have to move 
very frequently due to inadequate housing conditions.211 Moreover, the 
poor conditions tend to remain the same from one place to the next.212 
Many families often face issues such as poor plumbing and heating sys-
tems, broken windows, and cracking walls.213 
 High-poverty neighborhoods contribute to the prevalence of hous-
ing segregation.214 Low-income families are often unaware of the hous-
ing opportunities in other areas that the HCVP is meant to promote.215 
Moreover, little is done to expose families to the communities with 
higher quality housing.216 
B. Lack of Support from HUD & Housing Authorities 
 Whereas HUD and the housing authorities cannot be blamed for 
the community barriers, they do little to encourage voucher recipients 
to search for housing in better quality areas.217 Families left to search 
on their own are less likely to find units that the Housing Act intends to 
promote.218 HUD and the housing authorities also do little to ensure 
landlord compliance.219 The voluntary nature of the program allows 
landlords to act in their own interests at the expense of Section 8 ten-
ants.220 
                                                                                                                      
208 See Rice & Sard, supra note 203, at 6–7; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 771–72. 
209 See Rice & Sard, supra note 203, at 6–7; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 771–72. 
210 DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9. 
211 Id. 
212 See id. at 9–10. 
213 Id. 
214 See Turner et al., supra note 196, at 39–41; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 784–85. 
215 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006); Turner et al., supra note 
196, at 31; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 782–83. 
216 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2, 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 39–41; Zea-
bart, supra note 38, at 791. 
217 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2, 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 39–41; Zea-
bart, supra note 38, at 791. 
218 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 2, 9; Turner et al., supra 
note 196, at 39–41. 
219 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.404, .406 (2012); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10; Zeabart, 
supra note 38, at 791. 
220 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.302, .404, .406; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10; Anderson, 
supra note 137, at 392; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 790. 
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1. Administrative Inefficiencies 
 Although HUD requires housing authorities to provide an infor-
mal hearing process for some issues, such as a determination of a fam-
ily’s income, they are not required to provide hearings for funding 
based on landlord noncompliance.221 Moreover, the hearing proce-
dures do not offer much of a chance of success for Section 8 tenants 
fortunate enough to be granted one.222 
 HUD delegates the hearing procedures to the housing authori-
ties.223 This delegation has led to lax and inadequate procedural pro-
tection for tenants.224 For example, in Carter v. Lynn Housing Authority, 
the court found that the informal hearing regarding a tenant’s viola-
tion of the Housing Quality Standards failed to adequately provide the 
tenant with an opportunity to be heard.225 The court reasoned that the 
hearing officer’s failure to make any findings of fact was “contrary to 
our jurisprudence and [could not] be sanctioned.”226 The inadequate 
hearing process in Carter represents the overall lack of enforcement 
mechanisms provided by the Housing Act.227 Moreover, even after a 
housing authority holds a hearing, it is not necessarily bound by the 
hearing officer’s decision.228 
 In addition, families that lose their funding receive little help from 
housing authorities when they look to procure new Section 8 hous-
ing.229 The only support most families receive is a sheet of available 
                                                                                                                      
221 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(6). In contrast, participants are granted the right to an in-
formal hearing for terminations based on tenant action or inaction. Id. § 982.555(a)(1)(v). 
222 See Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1182–84 (11th Cir. 2008); Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 
785–87; 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e) (outlining the hearing procedures). Although the hearing 
procedures do not require housing authorities to provide hearings for funding termina-
tion based on landlord conduct, they do not explicitly preclude it either. See 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555(b)(6). Theoretically, a housing authority could provide a Section 8 tenant with 
the opportunity for a hearing if it wished to do so. See id. 
223 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.55(e)(1). 
224 See Basco, 514 F.3d at 1182–84; Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 785–87. 
225 See Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 785–87. 
226 Id. at 787. 
227 See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 366 (finding that “[t]here simply is no comprehensive fed-
eral remedial scheme provided for the voucher program” to demonstrate Congress’s in-
tent to preclude a private right); Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 729 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 785–87; see also Basco, 514 F.3d at 1182, 1183–84 (finding that the use 
of unauthenticated police reports alone was not sufficient evidence to find a violation of 
the tenant’s housing responsibilities). 
228 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(f) (2012). The regulatory language states that a housing au-
thority “is not bound by a hearing decision . . . [c]oncerning a matter for which [it] is not 
required to provide an opportunity for an informal hearing.” See id. 
229 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 39–41. 
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properties and participating landlords.230 These lists are out of date and 
do not provide a comprehensive overview of available housing.231 Re-
cently, a study done by the Poverty & Race Research Action Council 
revealed just how inadequate these lists are in providing assistance.232 
The fieldworkers took a voucher holder on an eight-hour search with 
the list provided by the Mobile Housing Authority.233 Despite the assis-
tance, the voucher holder was unable to find any potential leads.234 In 
fact, most of the units already had long waitlists or unreceptive land-
lords.235 
 Housing authority briefings also fail to provide adequate assis-
tance.236 These meetings are often poorly organized and focus mainly 
on advising program participants on the comprehensive HUD regula-
tions.237 Housing authorities offer little to encourage families to search 
for housing beyond the areas in which they are comfortable.238 This not 
only exacerbates the limited housing problem, but also detracts from 
the program’s policy of promoting economically mixed housing.239 
Without any assistance, low-income families only search in the areas 
with which they are familiar; these are usually high-poverty, racially seg-
regated communities.240 Not only does the administration struggle to 
promote the Housing Act’s policies, but it also does not do enough to 
enforce its requirements.241 
                                                                                                                      
230 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 39–41. 
231 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9 (noting that most of the units on the list would 
not be available for several years). In fact, most participants do not even know that they 
can search for housing off the list. Id. 
232 Id. This study concentrated on Section 8 program participants in Mobile, Alabama. 
Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. The participant’s voucher ultimately expired and she was living paycheck to pay-
check without any Section 8 rental assistance. Id. 
236 See Susan J. Popkin & Mary K. Cunningham, Searching for Rental Housing with Section 8 
in the Chicago Region, Urban Inst., at 28 (2000), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded 
PDF/410314.pdf; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 40–41. 
237 See Popkin & Cunningham, supra note 236, at 28; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 
41. 
238 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 41. 
239 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006); DeLuca et al., supra note 
38, at 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 40–41. 
240 DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 40–41. 
241 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418–19; 24 C.F.R. § 982.404 (2012); DeLuca et al., 
supra note 38, at 10; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1981. 
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2. Landlord Noncompliance & the Permeation of Housing 
Segregation 
 The HCVP is a voluntary program.242 Consequently, a landlord’s 
decision to opt out of the program, even if it adversely affects Section 8 
tenants, is met with little resistance from housing authorities.243 Given 
the high demand for housing, most landlords can find renters without 
participating in the program.244 Most landlords are also deterred by the 
negative preconceptions associated with the HCVP.245 For an increasing 
number of landlords, it is more convenient to rent without the pro-
gram because they do not have to deal with the administrative respon-
sibilities that come with the HCVP.246 Therefore, unless there is a short-
age of tenants in an area, an increasing number of landlords are opting 
to stay out of the HCVP.247 Moreover, landlords who wish to withdraw 
from the program can simply neglect their regulatory responsibilities 
and the housing authority will terminate funding for failure to com-
ply.248 These factors contribute to a landlord’s discrimination against 
Section 8 tenants.249 
 Another issue is the resistance to rent to voucher holders because 
of the stigma associated with the program.250 Landlords are reluctant to 
rent to Section 8 participants because they believe that such families 
bring crime into areas, are less likely to pay their portion of the rent, 
and drive down property values.251 Although the reality is that the exis-
tence of federal funding increases the likelihood that landlords will re-
                                                                                                                      
242 Anderson, supra note 137, at 380; see 24 C.F.R. § 982.302; Krista Sterken, Note, A 
Different Type of Housing Crisis: Allocating Costs Fairly and Encouraging Landlord Participation in 
Section 8, 43 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215, 221–22 (2009). 
243 See Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations 
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 369–70 (6th Cir. 2007); 24 C.F.R. § 982.302; Anderson, supra note 
137, at 380; Sterken, supra note 242, at 221; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 790. 
244 Turner et al., supra note 196, at 33; see Zeabart, supra note 38, at 790. 
245 See Turner et al., supra note 196, at 33; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982–84; Zeabart, 
supra note 38, at 790. 
246 See Turner et al., supra note 196, at 33; Rotem, supra note 137, 1983–84. 
247 See Turner et al., supra note 196, at 33; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 790. 
248 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418–19; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10. For 
example, a landlord could refuse to make repairs to a unit so that it fails to meet the Hous-
ing Quality Standards. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.401, .404 (2012); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 
10. 
249 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 1981–84; Sterken, supra note 242, at 222; Zeabart, 
supra note 38, at 787. 
250 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982–83; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 787–88. 
251 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982–83; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 788. 
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ceive rental payments, many landlords still worry about the effect Sec-
tion 8 tenants have on a neighborhood.252 
 Despite the courts’ and HUD’s reluctance to allow enforcement of 
the Housing Quality Standards, Section 8 tenants need a way to pre-
serve their rental assistance.253 An explicit private right would not only 
protect Section 8 tenants from inadequate landlords, but it would also 
help other low-income families by opening up more available housing 
options.254 
IV. A Private Right to Preserve Funding 
 The HCVP’s purpose is to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining 
a decent place to live and [to] promote[] economically mixed housing 
. . . .”255 Courts have interpreted this goal as a congressional intent to 
help fund housing costs, not to provide a right to housing of a certain 
caliber.256 Thus, per Supreme Court precedent, a private right to en-
force the Housing Quality Standards does not further the Housing 
Act’s policy concerns.257 HUD is in agreement, as it has expressly pro-
hibited program participants from enforcing the Housing Quality 
Standards.258 The more pertinent purpose that the courts miss, how-
ever, is that the enforcement of the Housing Quality Standards protects 
a tenant’s right to contest a unilateral termination of funding.259 
                                                                                                                      
252 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 1980, 1983; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 786. 
253 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 431; Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923; DeLuca et 
al., supra note 38, at 10. 
254 See Turner et al., supra note 196, at 41; Anderson, supra note 137, at 392; Sterken, 
supra note 242, at 218. 
255 United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006). 
256 See Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The purpose of the 
language referencing the residents is to provide a clear directive to the Secretary, not to 
confer substantive rights upon individuals.”); Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 609 
(5th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that congressional intent focuses on “impos[ing] a condition 
upon a receipt of government monies” but not conferring a private right to program par-
ticipants); Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1102 (6th Cir. 1985); Perry 
v. Hous. Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that the purpose of the legisla-
tion was to help the states); Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co., 818 F. Supp. 2d 414, 
435 (D.P.R. 2011) (“A section 8 tenant does not have the right to choose absolutely any 
housing unit . . . .”). 
257 See Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213; see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.406 (2012) 
(preventing Section 8 tenants from enforcing the Housing Quality Standards). 
258 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.406. 
259 See Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (reasoning that 
the “right not to be arbitrarily terminated from participation in the Housing Choice 
Voucher Program is hardly less important” than a right to challenge rent control); Carter 
v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778, 787 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the high stakes 
that are involved when a housing authority terminates funding). 
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 While program participants currently have a right to request an 
informal hearing over a termination due to tenant fault, there is no 
hearing requirement if the termination is based on the landlord’s fail-
ure to comply with the Housing Quality Standards.260 Similar to the pri-
vate right under the FHA, an explicit private right to enforce the Hous-
ing Quality Standards would provide Section 8 tenants with a means of 
contesting such termination.261 
A. An Amendment to the Housing Act 
 If Congress were to amend the Housing Act to explicitly permit a 
private right to enforce the Housing Quality Standards, courts would 
not have to struggle to determine if there is an implied right.262 Al-
though the four-point Cort test set the standard for identifying implied 
rights, the circuit courts do no uniformly apply the test.263 For instance, 
some courts have decided that the first two factors—identifying the 
class intended to benefit from the Act and the legislative intent—are 
more important than the legislative scheme inquiry.264 
 Neglecting the third and fourth factors of the Cort test, however, 
leads to an incomplete analysis.265 These factors demonstrate the prac-
tical effect that a lack of a private right has on Section 8 tenants.266 The 
                                                                                                                      
260 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555; Voucher Guidebook, supra note 7, at 16-1 to -2. An example of 
a termination due to tenant fault is the failure to pay rent. 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(a)(1). 
261 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006); Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3613 (2006); Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923; DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10. 
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997); Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 359 
(5th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a federal statute must “unambiguously” give rise to a private 
right of action); Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (“The statute nor the regulations nor 
any court has burdened a Section 8 tenant with this responsibility or bestowed a Section 8 
tenant with this right.”). 
263 See Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 725–30 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding an implied pri-
vate right of action under the Housing Act using all four factors of the Cort test); Perry, 664 
F.2d at 1215 (“It is plain that the federal enactments sought to create neither rights in the 
tenants nor duties in the landlords.”); Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 333, 
339–40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that “[t]he two first factors have been deemed to be the 
most important to” the Cort analysis). 
264 See Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 339–40; see also Caswell v. Detroit Hous. Comm’n, 418 
F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (assessing only legislative intent and not the other Cort fac-
tors). 
265 See Banks, 271 F.3d at 611 (looking at only the first two Cort factors and finding no 
private right); Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 339–40. 
266 See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 366 (finding that “[t]here simply is no comprehensive fed-
eral remedial scheme provided for the voucher program” to demonstrate Congress’s in-
tent to preclude a private right); Howard, 738 F.2d at 728–30 (reasoning that a private right 
will assist the legislative scheme without interfering with HUD’s discretionary responsibili-
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adverse effects resulting from a lack of enforcement mechanisms show 
that a private right fits into the legislative scheme of the Housing Act.267 
Therefore, the final two prongs of the Cort test need to be weighed just 
as heavily as the first two.268 
 Courts have also inconsistently found an implied private right for 
some provisions of the Housing Act, but not for others.269 Allowing rent 
control claims, but not claims enforcing the Housing Quality Stan-
dards, is inconsistent with the Act’s goals.270 By distinguishing general 
policy from congressional intent to create a private right, the court fails 
to recognize the real issue.271 All of the Housing Act provisions are in-
tended to benefit low-income families by promoting “decent, safe, sani-
tary and affordable housing.”272 Therefore, the right to enforce the 
rent control provisions is no more important than a right to enforce 
the Housing Quality Standards.273 
 Furthermore, following Graoch Associates #33, it is unclear whether 
disparate impact claims will be an adequate substitute for an explicit 
private right.274 First, the burden of proof that Section 8 tenants have to 
                                                                                                                      
ties); see also DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10–11 (documenting the effects of a lack of a 
private right for Section 8 tenants). 
267 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10–11; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1981–84; 
Sterken, supra note 242, at 221; Zeabart, supra note 38, at 787–89. 
268 See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 366; Howard, 738 F.2d at 728–30; DeLuca et al., supra note 
38, at 10–11; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1981–84. 
269 Compare Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 
430, 432 (1987) (finding a private right for the rent control provisions), and Johnson, 442 
F.3d at 367 (concluding that there is a private right under the rent control provisions for 
HCVP participants), with Banks, 271 F.3d at 611 (ruling that Section 8 tenants have no 
right to enforce the Housing Quality Standards), and Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 339–40 
(finding that there is no private right under the Housing Quality Standards provision). 
270 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006); Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
at 923 (“[The] right not to be arbitrarily terminated from participation in the [HCVP] is 
hardly less important than [the] right to contest rent and utility charges.”); see also Johnson, 
442 F.3d at 362 (reasoning that, “tak[ing] the entirety of the legislative enactment into 
account,” demonstrates the same overall purpose behind different provisions). 
271 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430 (concluding that the rent control provision’s “intent to 
benefit tenants is undeniable”); Banks, 271 F.3d at 611 (reasoning that the Housing Act 
provision merely explains what housing authorities must do to receive subsidies); Edwards, 
628 F. Supp. at 340 (“The courts have concluded that section 1437 represents a general 
statement of policy, ‘too amorphous to create a cause of action.’” (quoting Perry v. Hous. 
Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498, 502 (D.S.C. 1980), aff’d, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981))). 
272 Howard, 738 F.2d at 730; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437; Johnson, 442 F.3d at 362; Powell v. 
Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 812 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. 2004). 
273 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a, 1437f(o)(8); Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923; see also Carter, 
880 N.E.2d at 687 (recognizing the “exceptionally high” stakes involved with Section 8 
benefits). 
274 See Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., 1997 WL 1526484, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“[B]y 
statute and regulation it has been made clear that the Section 8 program is to be run in 
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meet is so high that it is unlikely to remedy the situation.275 Second, 
program participants that do not fall into one of the FHA’s protected 
classes are still left without any recourse.276 This does not mean, how-
ever, that these families are not victims of biases held against the 
HCVP.277 The decision not to rent to a family based on income has the 
same adverse effect as a decision not to rent based on race or natural 
origin.278 It limits the availability of affordable housing, which in turn 
concentrates poverty into segregated areas.279 
 An explicit private right like that provided in the FHA would help 
remedy many of the issues courts face when addressing Section 8 
claims.280 The courts would no longer have to parse through the Hous-
ing Act’s statutory language to try and speculate as to Congress’ in-
tent.281 This would provide courts with a more consistent framework to 
follow.282 More importantly, an explicit private right would further the 
Housing Act’s purpose of remedying “the acute shortage of decent and 
safe dwellings for low-income families.”283 
                                                                                                                      
conformance with the requirements of the FHA.”); Rotem, supra note 137, at 1990–99 
(discussing disparate impact claims brought by Section 8 tenants). Compare Graoch Assocs. 
#33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 376 
n.5 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[The Housing Act does] not include language indicating that Section 
8 landlords should be exempt from any FHA requirements.”), with Knapp v. Eagle Prop. 
Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1276, 1280 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that Section 8 tenants can-
not bring disparate impact claims under the FHA). 
275 See Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 377–79; Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 
983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (ruling that defendants can rebut a disparate impact challenge by 
providing evidence of a legitimate business purpose to justify the conduct). 
276 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006); Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 
437, 438 (finding that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for failure to accom-
modate under the FHA); Rotem, supra note 137, at 1991. 
277 See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act’s New Frontier, 31 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 155, 161–65 (1996); Rotem, supra note 137, at 1981–84; Zeabart, 
supra note 38, at 787–88. 
278 See Beck, supra note 277, at 161–65; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982–84; Zeabart, su-
pra note 38, at 787–88. 
279 See United States v. Big D Enters., 184 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 1999); Betsey, 736 F.2d 
at 988; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 31; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982–84. 
280 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613; Wright, 479 U.S. at 430; Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 369, 377; 
Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280; Howard, 738 F.2d at 728–30. 
281 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430; Johnson, 442 F.3d at 362; Banks, 271 F.3d at 611; Howard, 
738 F.2d at 726. 
282 See, e.g., Wright, 479 U.S. at 432; Howard, 738 F.2d at 726–30; Edwards, 628 F. Supp. at 
339–40. 
283 See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006); Howard, 738 F.2d at 730 
(concluding that a private right seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief will further 
the primary purpose of the Housing Act); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 10–11; Turner et 
al., supra note 196, at 31. 
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B. How a Private Right Resolves Housing Issues 
 An explicit private right would give program participants an op-
portunity to challenge a housing authority’s termination of funding 
caused solely by a landlord’s failure to comply with the regulatory stan-
dards.284 As a result, Section 8 tenants would not be jettisoned from 
their homes without a chance to plead their case.285 Instead, Section 8 
tenants would be able to bring claims enjoining landlords to make re-
pairs so their rental assistance is not terminated.286 This would mean 
that Ana Reyes-Garay and José Rosa-Rivera would have had a way to get 
their landlord to repair their ceiling so they could continue to live in 
their apartment and still receive their rental assistance.287 
 The ability to fight funding termination would save Section 8 ten-
ants from searching for new housing with inadequate resources.288 
They would not have to deal with the little support they currently re-
ceive from HUD and their local housing authorities.289 Furthermore, 
Section 8 tenants would not have to waste time on fruitless searches of 
low-quality homes.290 They also would not have to deal with the high 
likelihood of being denied a housing opportunity due to their Section 
8 status and thus be forced to live in areas with large concentrations of 
poverty.291 
 Moreover, with a private right to challenge this funding termina-
tion, it would be less likely that Section 8 families would need to re-
enter the market full of landlords reluctant to rent to voucher hold-
ers.292 In addition, landlords who already participate in the program 
would not be able to withdraw simply by neglecting their responsibili-
                                                                                                                      
284 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418–19; 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.401, .404 (2012) (stating 
a landlord’s responsibilities for participating in the program); DeLuca et al., supra note 38, 
at 10. 
285 See Perry, 664 F.2d at 1217; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 431; 24 C.F.R. § 982.555; 
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286 See Howard, 738 F.2d at 730; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418; Stevenson, 579 F. 
Supp. 2d at 923; 24 C.F.R. § 982.404. 
287 See Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 431. 
288 See Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923; Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 787; DeLuca et al., supra 
note 38, at 2, 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 40–41. 
289 See Stevenson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 923; Carter, 880 N.E.2d at 787; DeLuca et al., supra 
note 38, at 9–11; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 40–41. 
290 See DeLuca et al., supra note 38, at 9; Turner et al., supra note 196, at 40–41; Rotem, 
supra note 137, at 1982. 
291 See Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982; Sterken, supra note 242, at 221. 
292 See Beck, supra note 277, at 161–65; Rotem, supra note 137, at 1982–84; Zeabart, su-
pra note 38, at 790. 
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ties.293 It is likely that landlords who enter into the voucher program 
will be incentivized to make sure that their units comply with the Hous-
ing Quality Standards so they can avoid legal battles with their Section 8 
tenants.294 Along these same lines, a private right would reduce the 
threat of losing voucher status for failing to find new housing within the 
required time period.295 
 With more Section 8 tenants remaining in their homes, as well as 
more Section 8 apartments complying with the Housing Quality Stan-
dards, there would be additional available housing for voucher holders 
still in search of acceptable units.296 This would not only help more 
families find housing within the required time period, but it would also 
help families move into less impoverished areas.297 With more housing 
available for all low-income families, a private right to action would fur-
ther the policies of the Housing Act.298 
Conclusion 
 Decent and affordable housing is a matter of ever-increasing im-
portance in the United States. Currently, the demand is much greater 
than the supply, and it is adversely affecting low-income families. Even 
those families that receive rental assistance from federal programs, such 
as the HCVP, have trouble maintaining a decent place to live. Cur-
rently, the landlords of Section 8 tenants are not at risk of facing reper-
cussions if they fail to maintain their units in compliance with the 
Housing Quality Standards, leaving Section 8 tenants exposed to a po-
tential termination of their funding without any possible recourse. Sec-
tion 8 tenants are essentially on their own when it comes to these types 
of issues because Supreme Court precedent does not allow them to en-
force the Housing Quality Standards in court. 
 One way to combat this issue is to provide Section 8 voucher par-
ticipants with the right to contest the termination of funding due to 
poor landlord maintenance. Courts would no longer have to determine 
                                                                                                                      
293 See Perry, 664 F.2d at 1211; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418; DeLuca et al., supra 
note 38, at 10–11. 
294 See Perry, 664 F.2d at 1211; Reyes-Garay, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 418; DeLuca et al., supra 
note 38, at 10–11. 
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at 1979–80. 
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ad hoc whether a Section 8 tenant had a viable claim against a land-
lord, and there would be a set of procedures already established by 
HUD that would lead to an efficient resolution. This would allow fami-
lies to remain in their homes and leave more housing available to those 
who are still searching. It is imperative for Congress to take charge and 
provide Section 8 tenants with a right to protect themselves from fund-
ing termination. 
